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In The Matter of the Parental Rights as to N.J., 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 62 
(Dec. 24, 2009)1
 
 
Family Law - Termination of Parental Rights - ICWA 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal of a district court order terminating the parental rights of Dawn M. as to N.J., a 
minor.  The Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) petitioned the district court to 
terminate the parental rights of Dawn after unsuccessfully attempting to reunify N.J. with Dawn.  
Dawn appealed arguing the district court erred in (1) finding clear and convincing evidence of 
parental fault, and (2) applying the Existing Indian Family (EIF) doctrine after finding DCFS did 
not meet Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order terminating parental rights.  
The Court adopted a dual-standard burden of proof for termination of parental rights cases 
involving ICWA, utilizing Nevada's "clear and convincing evidence" for state law findings and 
ICWA's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for ICWA findings.  The Court upheld that there 
was clear and convincing evidence of parental fault.  The Court upheld the application of the EIF 
doctrine because the breakup of a Native American family was not at issue and neither the child's 
father (who was Native American) nor his tribe were contesting the termination. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 At N.J.'s birth, both N.J. and Dawn tested positive for Marijuana and Methamphetamine.  
Because N.J.'s putative father could not be located and no safe placement could be found, the 
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) was given custody of N.J. and she was placed 
into foster care.  Eventually N.J.'s putative father, Javy J., contacted DCFS.  DNA testing 
showed that Javy was the father of N.J.; nevertheless Javy denied paternity and never made 
further contact with DCFS.  Because Javy was an enrolled member of the Ely Shoshone Tribe, 
N.J. was eligible to become a member of the tribe.  Dawn was not a member of any Native 
American Tribe.  DCFS created a case plan for Dawn to follow in order to reunify with N.J., but 
Dawn did not comply.   
 DCFS petitioned the district court to terminate the parental rights of Dawn due to her 
failure to comply with the case plan and her continued drug use.  Because N.J. was a Native 
American child, the parental termination proceedings were subject to the Indian Child Welfare 
Act (ICWA).  The district court applied a dual-level evidentiary standard, using Nevada's "clear 
and convincing evidence" for state law findings and ICWA's "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard for ICWA findings.  The district court found that clear and convincing evidence 
supported terminating Dawn's parental rights, but DCFS failed to meet ICWA's "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" burden.  However, the district court held the Existing Indian Family Doctrine 
applied because neither N.J's putative father, nor her putative father's tribe, contested the 
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termination and the breakup of a Native American family was not at issue.  The district court 
granted the petition to Terminate Parental Rights. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Dawn appealed the termination of her parental rights arguing the district court erred in (1) 
finding clear and convincing evidence of parental fault, and (2) applying the Existing Indian 
Family (EIF) doctrine after finding DCFS did not meet ICWA's burden of proving its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court first addressed the conflicting evidentiary standards 
between Nevada law and ICWA.  Second, the Court analyzed the State law claims.  Finally, the 
Court addressed ICWA and the EIF exception. 
 
Conflicting Evidentiary Standards 
 
 Nevada and ICWA have conflicting evidentiary standards for cases involving the 
termination of parental rights.  While Nevada has a "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard 
for parental termination cases2 ICWA requires the petitioner to prove its case "beyond a 
reasonable doubt."3
 The Court held that Nevada’s "clear and convincing evidence" standard applies to state 
law findings and the ICWA "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applies to federal law 
findings.  The Court reasoned that ICWA sets forth "minimum Federal standards"
 
4 for the 
removal of Native American children from their families only as it relates to ICWA-related 
findings, not a uniform standard that applies to all findings.  The Court also cited to a statute 
which expressly states that ICWA's standards yield to other state or federal law if the law 
"provides a higher standard of protection to rights of the parents[,]" than ICWA.5
 
  The Court 
noted that nearly every state court that has interpreted the issue of conflicting standards came to 
the same conclusion. 
State Law Claims: Clear and Convincing Standard 
 
 Under Nevada law, "a petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
termination is in the child's best interest" and that parental fault exists.6
 To decide what is in the child's best interest, a court looks to the child's continuing need 
for "proper, physical, mental and emotional growth and development."
  The Court found that 
terminating parental rights was in N.J.'s best interest and that parental fault existed.  
7  Also, it is presumed that 
terminating parental rights in the child's best interest if the child has been in foster care for 14 of 
any 20 consecutive months.8
                                                 
2 Matter of Parental Rights as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. 422, 428, 92 P.3d 1230, 1234 (2004). 
  Applying the facts of the case, the Court held that the presumption 
3 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2006). 
4 Id. § 1902 (2006). 
5 Id. § 1921 (2006). 
6 Matter of Parental Rights as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. at 428, 92 P.3d at 1234.  See also NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105 
(2007). 
7 NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.005(2)(c) (2007). 
8 Id. § 128.109(2) (2007). 
applied and Dawn had the burden to overcome the presumption.9
 When a child has been placed in foster care and the ultimate goal of the termination of 
parental rights is to have the child's foster family adopt her, a court must look at "the extent the 
[child's] familial identity is with that family[,]"
  The Court held Dawn did not 
overcome the burden because she failed to maintain sobriety and failed to bond with N.J.   
10 "[t]he length of time the child has lived in a 
stable. . . foster home[,]"11 and "[t] the permanence as a family unit of the foster family."12
 Dawn also argued that there was not substantial evidence of parental fault.  The district 
court found parental fault on grounds of neglect, unfitness, and token efforts.  A child is 
neglected when a parent "neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsistence, 
education, medical or. . . other care necessary for [the child's] health, morals, or well-being."
  The 
Court held that there was substantial evidence that N.J. was fully integrated into her foster 
family.  N.J. had been placed with the foster family since leaving the hospital following her birth.  
Expert witnesses testified that N.J. was very well bonded with the foster family and removal 
from the foster family would be traumatic. 
13  
Courts shall consider excessive drug and alcohol use14 and the inability of public agencies to 
reunify the child with the parents15
 An unfit parent is "any parent of a child who, by reason of his fault or habit or conduct 
toward the child or other persons, fails to provide the child with proper care, guidance and 
support."
 when determining neglect.  Applying the facts of the case, the 
Court held Dawn's drug use, her failure to regularly visit with N.J., her failure to end an abusive 
domestic relationship, and her failure to provide financial assistance demonstrated neglect. 
16
 Parental fault can be established when a parent engages in only in token efforts to (1) " 
support or communicate with the child; (2) "prevent neglect of the child"; (3) "avoid being an 
unfit parent; or (4) "eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or emotional [harm] to the 
child."
  The Court upheld the district court's determination of unfitness due to Dawn's 
continued drug use and her failure to provide for any of N.J.'s physical or mental well-being.  
Although Dawn maintained sobriety for a few months, the Court held that it was insignificant as 
she continued to test positive for methamphetamine. 
17
 
  The Court upheld that Dawn had only engaged in token efforts because she only 
sporadically visited N.J., did not provide financial assistance, did not end an abusive domestic 
relationship, and failed to address her drug use. 
ICWA: Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard 
 
 ICWA's higher evidentiary standards were established due to concerns of an "alarmingly 
high percentage" of Native American children removed from their families and the failure of 
state courts to recognize traditional Native American social standards.  Before terminating the 
parental rights of a Native American child there must be "[a] determination, supported by 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including the testimony of a qualified expert witness, that 
                                                 
9 Matter of Parental Rights as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1426, 148 P.3d 759, 764 (2006). 
10 NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.108 (2007). 
11 Id. § 128.108(4) (2007). 
12 Id. § 128.108(5) (2007). 
13 Id. § 128.114(2) (2007). 
14 Id. § 128.106(4) (2007). 
15.Id.  § 128.106(8) (2007). 
16 Id. § 128.018 (2007). 
17Id.  § 128.105(2)(f) (2007). 
the continued custody by the parent or [Native American] custodian is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child[,]"18 in addition to other determinations.19
 The Court upheld the district court's determination that DCFS did not provide a tribal 
expert
 
20
  
 who could testify that returning N.J. to either of her parents would be likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to N.J.  Although a tribal expert and a clinical social 
worker testified, neither could testify as to whether returning N.J. would likely result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to N.J.  Therefore, DCFS did not meet ICWA's higher evidentiary 
standard. 
EIF Doctrine Exception 
 
 The Existing Indian Family (EIF) doctrine precludes ICWA from applying to cases where 
the court determines that there is no existing Native American family, meaning the child is not, 
and never was, part of a Native American family or tribe.21
 Here, the Court held the EIF doctrine was applied correctly because neither her father, 
nor his tribe, were contesting the termination and the termination would not result in the breakup 
of a Native American family.  The Court also noted that the foster family had testified that they 
were committed to educating N.J. about her Native American heritage. 
  The Court held the EIF doctrine 
should be used on a case-by-case basis to avoid results that are counter to ICWA's goal of 
protecting the best interest of Native American children. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 When termination of parental cases implicates ICWA, a dual-standard burden of proof 
should be used.  Specifically, Nevada's "clear and convincing evidence" should be used for state 
law findings and ICWA's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard should be used for ICWA 
findings.  The application of Existing Indian Family Doctrine (EIF) may be appropriate when the 
breakup of a Native American family is not at issue and neither the tribe nor the Native 
American Parent is contesting the termination. 
 
                                                 
18 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2006). 
19 See Id. § 1912(d) (2006) (Requiring "active efforts" to prevent the breakup of the family). 
20 Although ICWA does not define a "tribal expert," the Nevada Supreme Court looked to NEV. REV. STAT. § 
128.093(2) (2007) for guidance. 
21 In Re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 686 (Ct. App. 1996). 
